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Ontological theories of quantum mechanics provide a realistic description of single systems by
means of well-defined quantities conditioning the measurement outcomes. In order to be complete,
they should also fulfil the minimal condition of macroscopic realism. Under the assumption of out-
come determinism and for Hilbert space dimension greater than two, they were all proved to be
contextual for projective measurements. In recent years a generalized concept of non-contextuality
was introduced that applies also to the case of outcome indeterminism and unsharp measurements. It
was pointed out that the Beltrametti-Bugajski model is an example of measurement non-contextual
indeterminist theory. Here we provide a simple proof that this model is the only one with such
a feature for projective measurements and Hilbert space dimension greater than two. In other
words, there is no extension of quantum theory providing more accurate predictions of outcomes
and simultaneously preserving the minimal labelling of events through projective operators. As a
corollary, non-contextuality for projective measurements implies non-contextuality for unsharp mea-
surements. By noting that the condition of macroscopic realism requires an extension of quantum
theory, unless a breaking of unitarity is invoked, we arrive at the conclusion that the only way to
solve the measurement problem in the framework of an ontological theory is relaxing the hypothesis
of measurement non-contextuality in its generalized sense.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta, 02.50.Cw
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics provides an operationally com-
plete and minimal description of states, transformations
and events. Procedures that cannot be statistically dis-
criminated are described in the quantum formalism by
the same mathematical objects. This is for example the
case of the quantum state, which contains only the sta-
tistically significant information about the preparation
protocol. The same holds for events of a von Neumann
measurement, which are labelled by projective operators
Eˆk. This description is operationally complete since the
probability p(Eˆk) of an event Eˆk does not depend on
any supplementary information, such as the complete set
of events {Eˆ1, Eˆ2, ...} being measured. It is also minimal
because events labelled with different projectors have dif-
ferent statistical weights for some preparation state. For
reasons of economy, one could desire to preserve the same
minimal description also in ontological theories of quan-
tum mechanics, traditionally known as hidden variable
theories.
Originally, these theories were designed for the purpose
of introducing determinism and realism in quantum me-
chanics [1]. Whereas in the standard interpretation the
state represents the overall statistically significant infor-
mation about the preparation procedure, an ontological
theory provides a realistic description of the actual state
of affairs of a single system. Employing the recent ter-
minology [2], we call these states ontic states in order
to distinguish them from the quantum states. In the
framework of an ontological theory they condition the
probabilities of events. The theory is said outcome deter-
ministic if the ontic state determines with certainty the
result of a measurement, that is, if the conditional prob-
abilities of events are zero or one. For example this is the
case of the de Broglie-Bohm theory, where the ontic state
is identified with the quantum mechanical wave-function
and additional variables describing the actual positions
of the particles.
Additionally, an ontological theory should also satisfy
the minimal condition of macroscopic realism [3] in order
to be complete, that is, if there are two or more macro-
scopically distinct states available to a macroscopic sys-
tem, then the ontological theory must attribute one of
these states to the system. In general a theory with out-
come determinism, such as the de Broglie-Bohm theory,
fulfils this criterion. The Beltrametti-Bugajski model [4]
is a counter-example of ontological model for measure-
ments that does not provide a macroscopic realist de-
scription, unless the postulate of wave-function collapse
of the standard interpretation is retained in the model.
Since in the quantum formalism an event is labelled
by the projective operator Eˆk, it seems natural to keep
this structure also in the ontological theory. However
the Kochen-Specker theorem establishes that this is im-
possible for Hilbert space dimensions greater than 2 and
outcome determinism [5]. The occurrence of the event Eˆk
for a given ontic state depends in general on the whole
set of projectors involved in the measurement. This fea-
ture is called contextuality. In recent years a generalized
concept of non-contextuality was introduced that allows
for outcome indeterminism and apply to unsharp mea-
2surements [6], that it, positive operator valued measure-
ments (POVM). Furthermore this definition applies also
to states and transformations. Essentially, an ontological
theory is non-contextual for states, transformations and
measurement events if the probability distributions, the
transition rates and the conditional probabilities associ-
ated respectively with states, transformations and events
preserve the same minimal labelling of quantum mechan-
ics. In Ref. [6] it was shown that non-contextuality for
state preparation is incompatible with quantum statis-
tics. This can be seen also as a consequence of the fact
that the probability distribution associated with a pure
quantum state |ψ〉 cannot be a quadratic function of
|ψ〉 [7]. However there is not a similar constraint for mea-
surements [6]. Indeed the Beltrametti-Bugajski model [4]
is a simple example of indeterminist theory that is mea-
surement non-contextual.
In this article we report a simple proof that the
Beltrametti-Bugajski model is essentially the only the-
ory that is non-contextual for projective measurements.
In other words, we prove that no extension of quan-
tum theory exists providing more accurate predictions
of outcomes and simultaneously preserving the minimal
labelling of events through projective operators. These
findings are closely related to a recent result reported by
Colbeck and Renner [8]. They conclude that every exten-
sion of quantum theory with improved predictions of out-
comes is incompatible with the hypothesis that the mea-
surement parameters in a region of spacetime, Ω, can be
chosen to be statistically independent of any variable that
does not lie in the future lightcone of Ω. This hypothe-
sis implies a particular condition of non-contextuality for
measurements.
As a corollary of our result, we show that non-
contextuality for unsharp measurements is implied by
non-contextuality for sharp measurements (the projec-
tive ones). Finally, we arrive at the conclusion that the
only way to solve the measurement problem in the frame-
work of an ontological theory and fulfil the minimal con-
dition of macroscopic realism without breaking the uni-
tarity of evolutions is relaxing the generalized condition
of measurement non-contextuality. In Sec. II we intro-
duce the general properties that an ontological theory
has to satisfy and prove the theorem of uniqueness con-
sidering only projective measurements. In Sec. III the
discussion is extended to the case of positive operator
valued measurements. In Sec. IV we discuss the results
and their relation to the question tackled in Ref. [8].
First, we show that any extension of quantum theory
cannot be accomplished by preserving measurement non-
contextuality. Then, by noting that such an extension
is necessary in order to introduce macroscopic realism,
we infer that measurement contextuality is implied by
macroscopic realism. The conclusions are drawn in the
last section. The main message of this paper is showing
that macroscopic realism can turn to be a very useful
ingredient for establishing general properties that an on-
tological theory must satisfy.
II. NON-CONTEXTUALITY FOR PROJECTIVE
MEASUREMENTS
In an ontological theory a quantum state |ψ〉 is asso-
ciated with a probability distribution on an ontological
space whose elements are denoted by X . In general, the
probability distribution could depend on the context of
the preparation [6], thus we label it with an additional
variable η and define the map
|ψ〉 → {ρ(X |ψ, η)} (1)
that associates quantum states with sets of distribu-
tions. If there is no dependence on η, the ontological
model is said to be non-contextual for preparation of
pure states. Later on it will be shown that this kind
of non-contextuality is implied by measurement non-
contextuality. The probability distributions satisfy the
conditions
ρ(X |ψ, η) ≥ 0, (2)∫
dXρ(X |ψ, η) = 1. (3)
In the quantum formalism, a measurement is associ-
ated with a set of commuting projectors {Eˆ1, Eˆ2, ...} rep-
resenting the events. Each complete set of events satisfies
the relation ∑
k
Eˆk = 1ˆ. (4)
In the ontological model the probability P (Eˆk|X) of an
event Eˆk is conditioned by the ontic state X . It satisfies
the inequalities
0 ≤ P (Eˆk|X) ≤ 1 (5)
and, for each complete set {Eˆk} of commuting projectors,
the identity
∑
k
P (Eˆk|X) = 1. (6)
We have explicitly employed the hypothesis of measure-
ment non-contextuality by assuming that the probability
of an event Eˆk does not depend on the whole set of pro-
jective operators. The projector Eˆ1 can for example be
an element of the set {Eˆ1, Eˆ2, Eˆ3, ...} or {Eˆ1, Eˆ
′
2
, Eˆ′
3
, ...},
but the conditional probability does not depend on this
change of context. Gleason’s theorem states that a prob-
ability distribution satisfying properties (5-6) has the
form
P (Eˆk|X) = Tr[Eˆkρˆ(X)] (7)
for some Hermitian operator ρˆ(X), provided that the
Hilbert space has dimension 3 or greater [9].
The ontological theory is equivalent to quantum me-
chanics if ∫
dXP (Eˆk|X)ρ(X |ψ, η) = 〈ψ|Eˆk|ψ〉. (8)
3The Beltrametti-Bugajski model trivially satisfies
properties (2-8). The space of ontic states is the pro-
jective Hilbert space and the probability distribution as-
sociated with a quantum state |ψ〉 is
ρ(X |ψ) = δ(X − ψ), (9)
ψ being the ray of |ψ〉. The conditional probability for
an event Eˆk given the ontic state X is
P (Eˆk|X) = 〈X |Eˆk|X〉. (10)
It is simple to prove that any ontological theory that is
non-contextual for projective measurement is essentially
equivalent to the Beltrametti-Bugajski model.
Theorem 1. Given a quantum system with a Hilbert
space dimension greater than 2, any associated ontologi-
cal theory that is non-contextual for projective measure-
ments is equivalent to the Beltrametti-Bugajski theory
after a suitable coarse graining of the ontological space.
Proof: Since the ontological theory is non-contextual,
then any complete set of projective measurements is as-
sociated with conditional probabilities satisfying proper-
ties (5-6). Gleason’s theorem [9] implies that there exists
a trace-one Hermitian operator ρˆ(X) such that
P (Eˆk|X) = Tr[Eˆkρˆ(X)], (11)
for any set {Eˆk} of projective measurements. Let us con-
sider the event Eˆψ = |ψ〉〈ψ|. If X is in the support of
ρ(X |ψ, η) for some context η, then the conditional proba-
bility P (Eˆψ|X) is equal to 1. Indeed we have from Eq. (8)
that
∫
dXP (Eˆψ|X)ρ(X |ψ, η) = 1 (12)
Because of properties (2,3,5) and Eq. (12),
ρ(X |ψ, η) 6= 0⇒ P (Eˆψ|X) = 1. (13)
This implication is intuitively obvious, if a system is pre-
pared in a quantum state |ψ〉 and its ontic state is X ,
then the probability of obtaining the state |ψ〉 given X
is 1. Thus, since ρˆ(X) is a positive trace-one Hermitian
operator, we have from Eqs. (11,13) that
ρ(X |ψ, η) 6= 0⇒ ρˆ(X) = |ψ〉〈ψ|. (14)
Equation (14) says that if X is in the support of the dis-
tribution ρ(X |ψ, η) then the Hermitian operator ρˆ(X) is
equal to the pure density operator |ψ〉〈ψ|. As a conse-
quence, the support of two probability distributions as-
sociated with different rays are not overlapping. Further-
more, the conditional probabilities, given by Eq. (11), are
constant on the support of each probability distribution
ρ(X |ψ, η), that is, they are not sensitive to the fine struc-
ture of the distributions inside the support. This allows
us to perform a coarse graining of the ontological space,
dividing it in equivalent classes X˜ and associating each
class with a ray ψ,
X˜ ↔ ψ. (15)
The state X˜ is the union of the supports of the distribu-
tions ρ(X |ψ, η) with ψ fixed and η spanning every possi-
ble value. The coarse grained probability distribution on
X˜ is
ρ(X˜|ψ) = δ(X˜ − ψ) (16)
and does not depend on η. It is obtained by integrat-
ing the original distribution on the associated equivalent
class. The conditional probability given X˜ is
P (Eˆk|X˜) = 〈X˜ |Eˆk|X˜〉. (17)
The probability distribution (16) and the conditional
probability (17) correspond to the Beltrametti-Bugajski
model. 
Thus, any ontological theory that preserves the mini-
mal labelling for events of quantum mechanics necessar-
ily coincides with the Beltrametti-Bugajski model. In
particular, it is ψ-ontic [10], a ψ-ontic theory being an
ontological theory of quantum mechanics that associates
two different quantum states with non-overlapping prob-
ability distributions. In other words, the ontic state con-
tains the full information on the quantum state, which
therefore represents some element of reality. This prop-
erty was inferred in Ref. [11] by using the hypothesis of
POVM non-contextuality, which will be discussed in the
next section. The Beltrametti-Bugajski model is clearly
ψ-ontic because of the delta shape of the distribution de-
fined by Eq. (9). Conversely, in a ψ-epistemic theory,
only probability distributions associated with orthogonal
states have disjoint supports. Thus, it is not possible
to infer the quantum state by the knowledge of the ontic
state. In such a theory the quantum state does not repre-
sent an element of reality, but it contains a mere statisti-
cal information about the actual ontic state. An example
of ψ-epistemic model is the Kochen-Specker (KS) model
for a qubit [5]. The ontological space is the set of Bloch
vectors ~v. If a quantum state is represented by a Bloch
vector ~b, the associated probability distribution is, up to
a normalization constant,
ρ(~v|~b) = θ(~v ·~b)~v ·~b, (18)
where θ(x) is the Heaviside function. The support of this
probability distribution is a hemisphere. It is clear that
two probability distributions ρ(~v|~b) and ρ(~v|~b′) are not
overlapping only if ~b and ~b′ are anti-parallel, correspond-
ing to orthogonal quantum states. By labelling an event
with a Bloch vector ~c, the conditional probability of ~c
given the ontic state ~v is, in the KS model,
P (~c|~v) = θ(~c · ~v). (19)
This probability does not have the structure given by
Eq. (11) implied by the Gleason theorem for a Hilbert
space dimension greater than 2.
4There exist other models for qubit satisfying the
conditions (2-8) but inequivalent to the Beltrametti-
Bugajski model, such as the Bell’s model [12] and a one-
dimensional model recently reported in Refs. [13, 14].
III. NON-CONTEXTUALITY FOR UNSHARP
MEASUREMENTS
The generalized concept of non-contextuality can be
also applied to unsharp measurements, that is, positive
operator valued measurements (POVM). They can be
physically implemented by means of a projective mea-
surement on the system and an ancilla. A POVM is
defined by a set of positive operators {Qˆk} satisfying the
condition
∑
k
Qˆk = 1ˆ. (20)
Each event is associated with an operator Qˆk. An on-
tological theory is non-contextual for unsharp measure-
ments if the conditional probability for an event Qˆk given
an ontic state X does not depend on the whole set of pos-
itive operators {Qˆ1, Qˆ2, ...} and, more in general, on the
physical implementation of the measurement. It is a triv-
ial task to prove the following.
Lemma 1. The Beltrametti-Bugajski theory is POVM
non-contextual.
Proof: A POVM measurement is made on a system A
by performing a measurement of the projectors Eˆk on A
and an ancilla B. Let A be in a pure state. The overall
state is ρˆ = ρˆAρˆB, where ρˆA = |ψA〉〈ψA|.
The positive operators Qˆk are given by the equation
Qˆk = Tr[ρˆBEˆk]. (21)
The probability of event Qˆk is equal to the probability of
event Eˆk, that is,
p(Qˆk) ≡ TrA[QˆkρˆA] = TrAB[EˆkρˆAρˆB] ≡ p˜(Eˆk) (22)
At the ontological level, the probability of Qˆk is given by
p(Qˆk) = p˜(Eˆk) =∫
P (Eˆk|XA, XB)δ(XA − ψA)ρB(XB)dXAdXB,
(23)
where the probability distribution ρB satisfies the rela-
tion
ρˆB =
∫
|X〉〈X |ρB(X)dX. (24)
Note that this equation, because of the preparation con-
textuality for mixed states [6], is not necessarily in-
vertible and many probability distributions can corre-
spond to the same density operator ρˆB. For exam-
ple, the quantum state 1
2
| ↑〉〈↑ | + 1
2
| ↓〉〈↓ | is as-
sociated with any probability distribution of the form
1
2
δ(XB−ψ1)+
1
2
δ(XB−ψ2), where |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 are two
generic orthogonal states. Integrating in XB, Eq. (23)
becomes by means of Eqs. (17,24)
p(Qˆk) =
∫
Tr[|XA〉〈XA|ρˆBEˆk]δ(XA − ψA)dXA. (25)
Tracing away the system B and using Eq. (21), we obtain
that the probability of Qˆk is given by
p(Qˆk) =
∫
P (Qˆk|XA)δ(XA − ψA)dXA, (26)
where
P (Qˆk|X) = TrA(Qˆk|X〉〈X |), (27)
and the lemma is proved. 
Thus, at the ontological level the conditional probabil-
ity of an event depends only on the associated positive
operator. This labelling does not have memory of the
particular projectors Eˆk and ancilla state ρB(X) that
were used. Thus, the Beltrametti-Bugajski model is
POVM non-contextual. The proved theorem and lemma
imply the following.
Corollary: The projective measurement non-
contextuality implies POVM non-contextuality for
Hilbert dimensions greater than 2.
If we require the POVM non-contextuality for a qubit
as an additional hypothesis, it is easy to show, by us-
ing the generalized Gleason theorem in Ref. [15], that
the statement of the theorem proved in the previous
section holds in any dimension. Indeed the models by
Kochen and Specker, Bell and the recent one reported
in Refs. [13, 14] are all contextual for unsharp measure-
ments. Apart from the Bell model, this is also a direct
consequence of the fact that non-contextuality for POVM
implies ψ-onticity, as proved in Ref. [11]. Indeed neither
the Kochen-Specker model or that in Refs. [13, 14] are
ψ-ontic.
IV. EXTENDED QUANTUM THEORY AND
MACROSCOPIC REALISM
A. Extended quantum theory
In the Copenhagen interpretation, the quantum state
is not anything more than a mathematical tool for evalu-
ating probabilities. It merely represents the information
about the preparation procedure of systems. Conversely,
an ontological interpretation is designed to provide a real-
istic description of systems through well-defined classical
variables. In this section we take a step back and try a
compromise between the two interpretations. The tech-
nical results do not differ from those in Sec. II, but their
interpretation is different and makes our results more
closely related to recent findings [8].
Instead of replacing the quantum state with ontic
states, we can preserve it as a mathematical tool for de-
5scribing preparation procedures and enrich the descrip-
tion by some additional information, provided by classi-
cal variables. It is important to stress that |ψ〉 is not sup-
posed to describe some real entity, such as in de Broglie-
Bohm mechanics and Beltrametti-Bugajski model. In
this framework, an ensemble of systems, identically pre-
pared in a pure state |ψ〉 within the context η, is de-
scribed by the preparation protocol {|ψ〉, η} and a prob-
ability distribution, ρ(Y |ψ, η), of a classical variable Y ,
that is,
preparation→ {|ψ〉, η, ρ(Y |ψ, η)}. (28)
The probability of an outcome Eˆk is conditioned by
the classical variable Y and depends also on the over-
all preparation procedure {|ψ〉, η}. Additionally, for the
moment we assume that it also depends on the measure-
ment context, specified by a parameter, τ . We indicate
this conditional probability with P (Eˆk|Y, τ, ψ, η). Thus,
event probability→ P (Eˆk|Y, τ, ψ, η). (29)
The model is equivalent to quantum theory if equation
∫
dY P (Eˆk|Y, τ, ψ, η)ρ(Y |ψ, η) = 〈ψ|Eˆk|ψ〉 (30)
is satisfied. The overall statements (28-30) define an
extended quantum theory, where quantum information
is supplemented by classical information. The ex-
tension is said non-trivial if the conditional probabil-
ity P (Eˆk|Y, τ, ψ, η) is not constant on the support of
ρ(Y |ψ, η). It provides a fully ontological description
if P (Eˆk|Y, τ, ψ, η) does not depend on {ψ, η}. The
Beltrametti-Bugajski model is an example of trivial ex-
tension where the classical variables replace completely
ψ. In practise, ψ is reinterpreted as a physical field,
but no further information is introduced that provides a
more accurate predictions of outcomes. Just as quantum
theory is formally identical to the Beltrametti-Bugajski
model and differs only in the interpretation, any triv-
ial extension of quantum theory is formally identical to
the Beltrametti-Bugajski model. In general, an extended
quantum theory is formally identical to a ψ-ontic theory
where (ψ, Y ) are the ontological variables, with the only
difference that the quantum state |ψ〉 is interpreted as
a container of information about the preparation proce-
dure. In other words, an extended theory is a mixture of
an operational and ontological description.
The Kochen-Specker theorem establishes that there is
no deterministic ontological theory that is non-contextual
for measurements. However, this result does not rule out
the possibility of supplementing the quantum state with
some amount of classical information and simultaneously
preserving the minimal labelling of events through pro-
jective operators (without τ). So in principle, we could
have a non-trivial extended quantum theory defined by
statements (28-30) and satisfying the condition
P (Eˆk|Y, τ, ψ, η) = P (Eˆk|Y, ψ, η). (31)
With a slight abuse of terminology, we call this condition
non-contextuality for measurements. This expanded def-
inition is justified by the following.
Lemma 2. If there is a (non-trivial) extended quantum
theory that is non-contextual for measurements, then
there is a (non-trivial) ontological theory with the same
property. The converse is also true.
By non-trivial ontological theory we mean a theory
that is essentially different from the Beltrametti-Bugajski
model. The proof of this lemma is very simple. Indeed,
every extended theory generates an ontological theory
with (ψ, Y ) (and possibly the preparation context η) as
ontological variables. Furthermore, if the extended the-
ory is non-trivial, also the generated ontological theory
is non-trivial. It is obvious that the property of non-
contextuality is preserved in this change of interpreta-
tion. The converse is also true, since a (non-trivial) on-
tological theory is a (non-trivial) extended quantum the-
ory where the conditional probabilities for events do not
depend on ψ.
By using the results in Sec. II, it is easy to prove the
following.
Theorem 2. Quantum theory cannot be extended in a
non-trivial way by preserving the minimal labelling for
events of quantum mechanics. In other words, there is
not a non-trivial extended quantum theory that is non-
contextual for measurements.
In spite of the different interpretation, this theorem is a
rephrasing of the theorem 1 proved in Sec. II. Indeed, as
previously said, an extended theory is formally identical
to an ontological theory, where (ψ, Y ) are the ontological
variables. We have proved in Sec. II that a such the-
ory is essentially equivalent to the Beltrametti-Bugajski
model under the hypothesis of non-contextuality for mea-
surements, that is, Y does not introduce any improve-
ment in the prediction of outcomes. Indeed, as stated
by lemma 2, if there was a non-contextual and non-
trivial extended theory, then there would be a non-
contextual ontological theory essentially different from
the Beltrametti-Bugajski model.
A similar theorem was proved in Ref. [8], where the
authors used a hypothesis of statistical independence be-
tween the setting parameters of a measurement and the
variables that do not lie in the future light cone of those
parameters (free choice hypothesis). By means of this
hypothesis they derived a relation similar to Eq. (31),
which directly implies that quantum mechanics cannot
be extended. This was initially accomplished in the case
of maximally entangled states and subsequently general-
ized by means of the hypothesis (called QMb) that every
quantum process is unitary. Our proof has the advan-
tage of simplicity, resting upon the well-established and
powerful Gleason theorem [9]. Furthermore it does not
need any additional hypothesis on the dynamics, such as
QMb.
6B. Macroscopic realism
It is interesting to note that macroscopic realism re-
quires that some amount of classical information has
to be supplied to the quantum state, provided that the
quantum alternatives have reached some level of ”macro-
scopicness”. In order to be complete, a theory should
contain the description of this classical information in
its formalism. Suppose for example that a microscopic
quantum system, A, is in the superposition |1〉 + | − 1〉
and interacts with a macroscopic device, D, which is ini-
tially in the state |ϕ0〉. After the interaction the overall
quantum system evolves towards the entangled state
|Ψ〉 = |1〉|ϕ1〉+ | − 1〉|ϕ−1〉,
where |ϕ±1〉 are two macroscopically distinct states, for
example corresponding to different positions of a pointer.
The state |Ψ〉 contains the information about the initial
preparation of the system A+D and its subsequent evo-
lution. Macroscopic realism imposes that this informa-
tion has to be supplemented with some classical informa-
tion indicating the actual macroscopic state of the device.
The classical information can be stored in a binary vari-
able, n = ±1, where ±1 correspond to the macroscopic
states |ϕ±1〉. In this extended description, the overall
information on the system A+D is given by the pair
(|Ψ〉, n)
and, additionally, other parameters describing the con-
text. In general, the outcome of every external observa-
tion performed on A+D has a probability that depends
on both |Ψ〉 and n. Indeed, the probability of finding
the device in the state |ϕ±〉 has to be equal to 1 or 0,
provided that n = ±1 or n = ∓1. In other words, the
outcome is completely determined for the measurement
of the ”pointer” state and the extension cannot be trivial.
Thus, macroscopic realism imposes that quantum theory
has to be extended in a non-trivial way with some amount
of classical information and this cannot be accomplished
without giving up non-contextuality for measurement. In
this inference we have implicitly used the additional hy-
pothesis of unitarity for evolutions, as discussed in the
following paragraph.
It is worthwhile to note that in practise it is not possi-
ble to perform every kind of measurements on a macro-
scopic system and the events that can be actually ob-
served are not in general affected by the replacement of
the superposition of |1〉|ϕ1〉 and | − 1〉|ϕ−1〉 with their
mixture. This property is called decoherence and pro-
vides a justification to the quantum state reduction,
which is one of the postulates of quantum theory. It im-
plies a loss of information, for which the states (|Ψ〉,±1)
are indistinguishable from the states (| ± 1〉|ϕ±1〉,±1).
The reduction postulate is particularly relevant in this
context because the quantum state collapse into macro-
scopic distinct states would make unnecessary the addi-
tion of classical information and would remove the con-
tradiction between non-contextuality for measurements
and macroscopic realism. In our opinion, the quantum
state collapse is not more fundamental than the loss of in-
formation in statistical mechanics and in fact the detailed
full information is provided by the state (|Ψ〉,±1). In-
deed, in principle nothing forbids one to perform a mea-
surement that is able to distinguish a superposition of
states from their mixture. This is particularly true if the
device is mesoscopic. Promoting the decoherence to the
rank of fundamental principle would raise the issue of
deciding what is the level of ”macroscopicness” and de-
coherence above which a superposition is replaced by a
mixture.
We conclude this section by noting that an argument
that uses decoherence as a fundamental principle for ex-
plaining macroscopic realism implicitly seems to require
a weakening of causality principle. Indeed, according to
this explanation, one system is in a defined macroscopic
system because never in the future there will be an emerg-
ing property revealing interference between macroscopi-
cally distinct states. This point is made more explicit
in the consistent histories approach to quantum mechan-
ics [16], where the condition for consistency involves the
whole temporal history. The weakening of causality prin-
ciple was also suggested in recent papers [13, 14, 17] as
a solution of the problem of the exponential growth of
resources that are required for specifying an ontic state.
However, the challenge of undermining the causality prin-
ciple is beyond the purpose of this paper.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proved that the Beltrametti-Bugajski model
is in practise the only model that is non-contextual for
projective measurements and Hilbert space dimension N
greater than 2. Equivalently, it is not possible to extend
non-trivially quantum theory without giving up non-
contextuality for measurements. As a corollary, we have
shown that POVM non-contextuality for N > 2 is im-
plied by sharp measurement non-contextuality. The the-
orem can be generalized to a qubit by employing the addi-
tional hypothesis of POVM non-contextuality for N = 2.
The Beltrametti-Bugajski model is the simplest ex-
ample of ontological theory of a measurement process.
However it cannot be considered a completely realistic
theory. In particular, since it still needs to invoke a mea-
surement made by something external to the system, in
fact does not solve the measurement problem without re-
taining the postulate of wave-function collapse required
in the standard intepretation. An exhaustive realistic
model should at least satisfy a criterion of macroscopic
realism, attributing for example a sufficiently well de-
fined value to the position of macroscopic objects that
does not depend on a possible external observation. This
is the case of the de Broglie-Bohm mechanics, where
the wave-function is supplied by additional variables de-
scribing the positions of all the particles compounding
a system. The Beltrametti-Bugajski model fails to sat-
7isfy the criterion of macroscopic realism. Suppose for
example that the position of an object is in the super-
position of two macroscopically separated values. The
Beltrametti-Bugajski model, being in fact a rephrasing
of the quantum mechanics, does not give any description
of the actual position of that object, unless a breaking of
unitarity is invoked through the quantum state collapse.
Indeed, any non-trivial extension of the theory acted to
introduce macroscopic realism without breaking unitar-
ity would automatically make the theory measurement
contextual. Thus, the only way to solve the measurement
problem in the framework of an ontological theory is re-
laxing the hypothesis of measurement non-contextuality
in the generalized sense introduced in Ref. [6].
We conclude noting that macroscopic realism implies
a certain degree of outcome determinism, as discussed in
Sec. IV. Given a macroscopic system, there should be
always a set of macroscopic states such that the system
is in one of them. The result of a possible measurement,
acted to know that state, would be completely deter-
mined by the hidden variable state of the system. It is
interesting to observe that the criterion of macroscopic
realism is rarely taken in consideration in the study of
ontological models. We have shown that it imposes some
constraints and is very useful to deduce general prop-
erties that an ontological theory must satisfy, such as
measurement contextuality.
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